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In 1975, 50 year-old Americans could expect to live slightly longer than their European 
counterparts. By 2005, American life expectancy at that age has diverged substantially 
compared to Europe. We find that this growing longevity gap is primarily the symptom of real 
declines in the health of near-elderly Americans, relative to their European peers. In 
particular, we use a microsimulation approach to project what US longevity would look like, if 
US health trends approximated those in Europe. We find that differences in health can 
explain most of the growing gap in remaining life expectancy. In addition, we quantify the 
public finance consequences of this deterioration in health. The model predicts that gradually 
moving American cohorts to the health status enjoyed by Europeans could save up to $1.1 
trillion in discounted total health expenditures from 2004 to 2050. 
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A.  Introduction 
 
The populations of the United States and Western Europe have experienced large gains in 
life-expectancy over the last century. For example, U.S. life expectancy at birth increased 
from 61 years in 1933 to 78 years in 2004.
2 In most developed countries, age-specific 
death rates have declined exponentially at a constant rate (Tuljapurkar et al., 2000). Large 
declines in infectious diseases drove down mortality rates during the first half of the 20th 
century, particularly for the young.  During this period, life expectancy across developed 
countries also converged (White, 2002). 
The second half of the 20
th century witnessed continued growth in longevity, but 
of a much different nature.  Reductions in mortality among the elderly, rather than the 
young, dominated movements in life expectancy (Olshansky and Carnes, 2001).  During 
this era, another difference emerged:  the US began to fall behind other developed 
countries in terms of life expectancy (Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002).  So far, little is known 
about the causes of this widening gap (Lee, 2003). 
  According to the Human Mortality Database (HMD), in 1975, life expectancy at 
age 50 was similar in the US and Europe.  Americans lived on average 27.3 years, 
compared to 27.1 years for a representative group of Western European countries 
(Denmark, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and Sweden).
3  Over the ensuing 
decades, however, European life expectancy grew more quickly.  As Figure 1 shows, a 50 
year-old American in 2004 could expect to live 31 years, compared to 32.5 years in 
Europe. A difference of 1.5 years in life expectancy implies a non-trivial welfare loss. 
For example, using $100,000 as a lower-bound estimate of the value of a statistical life 
year (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003), this represents at least a $700 million dollar disadvantage 
for the current generation of 50 year olds.  While the cross-country longevity gap remains 
smaller than within-country differences along the lines of socioeconomic status, the 
                                                 
2 Based on life tables collected in the Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org). 
3 We used period life-table data from the Human Mortality Database (HMD, www.mortality.org). The 
HMD did not have data going back to 1975 for Germany.   3 
surprise lies in the divergent paths of the US and Europe, in spite of their similar levels of 
economic development.  
Over that same period, chronic illnesses associated with more sedentary lifestyles 
have spread, somewhat mitigating improvements in life expectancy (Goldman et al., 
2005; Lakdawalla et al., 2005).  Due to data limitations, it is hard to assess whether trends 
in chronic disease have spread more rapidly in the US, but historical data do exist on 
risky health behaviors that contribute to chronic disease.  Using data from the OECD, 
Figure 2 shows tobacco consumption per capita (1960-2005) and obesity rates for the 
U.S. and European countries where data exist (1978-2005).  While tobacco consumption 
is higher in Europe today, it was much higher in the US for the earliest years in the 
figure.  While near-elderly Americans are less likely to be smoking now than their 
European counterparts, they are much more likely to have ever smoked.  One plausible 
explanation for this rapid decrease is that smoking cessation programs have been more 
effective in the U.S. than in Europe but that take up as started earlier. For example, Cutler 
and Glaeser (2006) argue that 50% of the gap in current smoking status is due to 
differences in beliefs about the health effects of smoking, Europeans thinking it is not as 
harmful for health as Americans do.  
The second panel shows the obesity rate, defined as BMI>30, for the U.S. and a 
set of European countries for whom data is available. Both the level and slope are larger 
in the U.S. The U.S. and Europe have diverged starkly since the 70s.
4 Reduction in the 
costs of food consumption and technological innovation which led to more sedentary 
work are two key explanations put forward to explain the U.S. trend (Lakdawalla and 
Philipson, 2002). Cutler et al. (2003) argue that these changes may have taken place more 
slowly in Europe due in particular to stricter food regulation. 
Figure 3 displays what are perhaps the consequences of these divergent trends; the 
US prevalence of chronic disease and risky behavior is much higher than in European 
countries (Banks et al., 2006; Andreyeva et al., 2007).  The figure displays these data 
                                                 
4 Data based on measured weight and height rather than self-reported. Data for the U.S. is from the 
NHANES survey. The OECD and WHO harmonize these measures across countries for survey and 
methodological differences.   4 
among the 50-55 year old population using internationally comparable survey data.
5 
Except for current smoking status, Americans look worse in terms of health. Several of 
the differences are quite large. For instance, Americans are about twice as likely to have 
hypertension, twice as likely to be obese, twice as likely to have diabetes, and nearly 50% 
more likely to have ever smoked,  As we demonstrate latter, these differences are 
unlikely to be explained by differences in diagnosis or reporting. For example, the 
prevalence of stroke is twice as low in Europe as in the U.S., a condition which rarely 
goes undiagnosed. 
Clearly, the apparent gaps in observed health status would contribute to a gap in 
longevity, but it is not obvious how big the contribution will be.  For instance, there are 
well-documented longevity gaps across racial and socioeconomic lines, within countries.  
These are not fully explained by differences in observed health status.  The question is 
whether “being American” is an independent mortality risk factor, in the same way that 
being poor or being black increase risk above and beyond observed health.  
Furthermore, it is worth considering the fiscal consequences of these trends as the 
United States and Europe begin to grapple with the consequences of shifting population 
demographics.  On the one hand, decreased longevity—especially due to higher mortality 
at older ages—can ease the burden on public pension programs such as Social Security 
and public insurance.  However, if the longevity decrease comes at the expense of 
increased chronic disease and disability, then there is increased pressure on public health 
insurance and disability insurance programs.  The net effects then are unclear.   
This paper aims to address this and several related questions. First, we assess 
whether differences in near-elderly health are enough to explain the longevity gap across 
countries.  From a policy perspective, it is important to know whether differences in life 
expectancy are due to differences in health before or after age 50.  The answer to this 
question identifies the target population for health interventions, and provides insight into 
the relative value of preventive or curative care. While consistent historical data on health 
                                                 
5 We used the 2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study in the U.S. and the Survey of 
Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe to produce these numbers. Properly weighted, both surveys are 
representative of the age 50+ population in each country. Questions on health conditions are very similar. 
The text of those questions is reproduced in Table A.1 of the appendix.   5 
conditions are unavailable across countries, we use a dynamic microsimulation model 
calibrated to match historical U.S. health and longevity dynamics over the life course. We 
then simulate a counterfactual where the health of an American cohort mimics the health 
of Europeans observed in 2004. Second, we quantify the fiscal consequences of 
differences in health and longevity across countries, using the detailed policy modules 
from the micro simulation model.  
The paper is structured as follow. Section B describes the model that is used to 
describe the long-term economic consequences of these trends. Section C uses the model 
to quantify the effect of differences in health on longevity and government 
expenditures/revenues, and Section D discusses the results.  
B.  Microsimulation Model of Health and Economic Dynamics 
B.1  Background 
To link morbidity to longevity, one needs a transition model that relates current 
health to the future risk of mortality.  Given our interest in fiscal consequences, we also 
need a model linking health and economic outcomes. Both the epidemiological and 
economic literatures contain complex models of each, but few integrate both.  
The current social science literature features several well-known and 
complementary approaches for measuring population health and projecting future disease 
burden and mortality—including models by Manton and co-authors (Manton, Singer et 
al. 1993), Lee (Lee 2000), and Hayward (Hayward and Warner 2005). Across these 
models, there is an underlying trade-off between the complexity of the data required, and 
the broad applicability of the model.  For instance, early life table approaches like those 
of Sullivan (1971) require only age-specific population data as well as corresponding 
disability rates at those same ages; these elements are all present in cross-sectional data. 
However, these straightforward data requirements come at a cost, as the Sullivan method 
appears too insensitive to large changes in disability and mortality, and may thus 
underestimate future trends in population health (Bonneux, Barendregt et al. 1994). 
Multistate life table models and microsimulation models that exploit longitudinal data, 
however, can accommodate richer dynamics than Sullivan’s method and thus provide   6 
more flexibility in modeling the dynamic interplay between morbidity, disability, and 
mortality. Such dynamic models obtain population health trends as aggregates from 
individual stochastic processes underlying these outcomes. 
We use a model that considers the dynamic interplay between a large number of 
health outcomes as well as economic outcomes. The model is an extension of the Future 
Elderly Model (FEM) (Goldman, Hurd et al. 2004). This is a reduced-form markovian 
model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity and correlation across outcomes. In that 
sense, it is well equipped to analyze the effect of the health differences on longevity and 
public financial liabilities, as it allows for complex interactions between multi-
dimensional measures of health and economic outcomes.   
B.2  Functioning of the Dynamic Model 
B.2.1  Overview 
The Future Elderly Model (FEM) was developed to examine health and health care costs 
among the elderly Medicare population (age 65+) (Goldman, Hurd et al. 2004). The FEM 
has been used to assess the technological risk facing Medicare(Goldman, Shang et al. 
2005), to forecast the costs of obesity in older Americans (Lakdawalla, Goldman et al. 
2005); to model disability-related trends (Chernew, Goldman et al. 2005); to examine the 
future costs of cancer (Bhattacharya, Shang et al. 2005); to estimate the value of 
preventing disease after age 65 (Goldman, Cutler et al. 2006), and to compare the impact 
of pharmaceuticals on longevity in Europe and the United States (Lakdawalla, Goldman 
et al. 2009). The most recent version now project these outcomes for all Americans aged 
50 and older using data from the Health and Retirement Study. The defining 
characteristic of the model is the use of real rather than synthetic cohorts, all of whom are 
followed at the individual level. This allows for more heterogeneity in behavior than 
would be allowed by a cell-based approach. The model has three core components: 
The initial cohort module predicts the health and socio-economic outcomes of 
new cohorts of 50 year-olds.  This module calibrates the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) to reflect population trends observed in younger populations from the National 
Health Interview Study (NHIS).  It allows us to generate new cohorts as the simulation 
proceeds, so that we can measure outcomes for the age 50+ population in any given year.    7 
The transition module calculates the probabilities of entering and exiting various 
health states, and the likelihood of various financial outcomes. The module takes as 
inputs risk factors such as smoking, weight, age and education, along with lagged health 
and financial states.  This allows for a great deal of heterogeneity and fairly general 
feedback effects. The transition probabilities are estimated from the longitudinal data in 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). These probabilities are then used to simulate the 
path of individuals in the simulation.  
The policy outcomes module aggregates projections about individual-level 
outcomes into policy outcomes such as taxes, medical care costs, pension benefits paid, 
and disability benefits. This component takes account of public and private program rules 
to the extent allowed by the available outcomes. Because we have access to HRS-linked 
restricted data from Social Security records and employer pension plans, we are able to 
realistically model retirement benefit receipt.  
Figure 4 provides a schematic overview of the model.  We start in 2004 with an 
initial population aged 50+ taken from the HRS. We then predict outcomes using our 
estimated transition probabilities. Those who survive make it to the end of that year, at 
which point we calculate policy outcomes for the year. We then move to the following 
year, when a new cohort of 50 year-olds enters (with a different health profile). These 
entrants, along with the survivors from the last period, constitute the new age 50+ 
population, which then proceeds through the transition model as before.  This process is 
repeated until we reach the final year of the simulation. The model can be run for a single 
cohort, without entering cohorts, or at the population level where successive cohorts enter 
the simulation. In the population-level simulation, we can track both population as well 
as cohort outcomes. In what follows we give an overview of each component of the 
model. The technical appendix accompanying this paper contains more details on the 
implementation. 
B.2.2  Initial Cohort Module 
We aim to characterize outcomes for the age 50+ population. Hence, we need to 
predict the characteristics of the current and future 50 year-old population, in terms of 
health, demographics and economic outcomes.  Unfortunately, the HRS does not include 
respondents younger than age 50; therefore, the characteristics of future 50 year-olds   8 
must be modeled using data on younger individuals.  It is not sufficient to merely 
replicate the 50-year olds observed today because of the non-stationarity of health in 
younger populations.   
We estimate trends in the health of 50 year-olds using two methods. First, we use 
the method described in Goldman, Hurd et al. (2004) to calculate trends in disease 
prevalence from the National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS). The trends we estimate 
are relatively close to other independent estimates, as documented in the appendix. For 
outcomes other than disease prevalence, we use existing estimates, all of which are 
documented in the technical appendix.  
Second, we use the 50 year-old HRS respondents from 2004 as a template for 
future cohorts of 50 year-olds.  We adjust their health to match projected prevalence 
levels, using the trends estimated in the first step.  For example, if obesity is projected to 
rise in 2020, we increase the rate of obesity within the cohort of 50 year-olds, by 
reassigning enough non-obese individuals to obesity status.  Since obesity is correlated 
with other outcomes such as hypertension and diabetes, we reassign obesity status so that 
those at greatest risk are more likely to acquire it.   
The reassignment is governed by a latent health model with correlated 
unobservables.  An individual’s disease status is a function of the mean population 
probability of the disease, along with a random error term.  For an individual, the error 
terms are correlated across diseases.  This builds in the possibility that, for instance, the 
occurrence of diabetes and hypertension are correlated.  We jointly estimate the 
population means and the covariance structure of the error terms by maximum simulated 
likelihood (more details appear in the technical appendix). Table 1 lists all the outcomes 
that we model. There are seven binary outcomes:  hypertension, heart disease, diabetes, 
fair or poor self-reported health, labor force participation, insurance status and positive 
wealth. (The inclusion of this last indicator is necessary because of the observed spike in 
the distribution of net wealth at zero in the HRS.) There are three ordered outcomes:  
BMI status, smoking status and functional status in the transition model. Finally, there are 
five continuous outcomes:  average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), the number of 
quarters of coverage; earnings, financial wealth, and defined contribution (DC) wealth. 
We also model respondents’ pension plan outcomes: whether they have a defined benefit   9 
(DB) or DC plan on the current job; the earliest age at which they are eligible; and the 
conventional retirement age. We group the latter around peaks in the empirical 
distribution. The most common early retirement age is 55, and the modal retirement age 
is 62. Finally, each of these outcomes depends on fixed characteristics such as race, 
education, gender and marital status. We also consider cancer, lung disease and stroke as 
fixed covariates, because their prevalence is very low in this population (age 50-53). 
Estimates are presented in the appendix. 
Finally, the size of the entering cohort is adjusted to reflect population projections 
from Census by gender and race. We also adjust the size of the initial new cohort in 2004 
to Census estimates by gender, race and ethnicity. 
B.2.3  Transition Model 
The transition model tracks movement among states as a function of risk and 
demographic factors.  The technical appendix provides details on the parametric 
structure, estimation, and validation of the model.  Here we enumerate and discuss all the 
key inputs and outputs of the model, and how they are measured.   
The data come from the 1992 to 2004 biennial waves of the HRS. We consider 
both health and economic outcomes, all of which are listed in Table 2.  The table lists 
several groups of variables: diseases, risk factors, functional status, labor force and 
benefit status, financial resources, nursing home residence, and death.  At a particular 
point in an individual’s life, the model takes as inputs the individual’s risk factors, along 
with her lagged disease status, functional status, labor force and benefit status, financial 
resources, and nursing home status.  The outputs are current disease status, functional 
status, labor force and benefit status, financial resources, and nursing home status.  More 
detail on variable measurement is presented below. 
Transition rates are allowed to differ across demographic and economic groups. In 
particular, we allow differences by gender, race and ethnicity, education, and marital 
status. Transition equations are estimated on 7 waves of the HRS.  We assess the fit of 
the model by simulating 2004 outcomes for the 1992 HRS respondents; these are then 
compared actual outcomes. We use half the sample for estimation and the other half for 
simulation. In general, the model fits the data quite well, with a close correspondence   10 
between predicted and actual outcomes in most areas. Complete results can be found in 
Table A.9 of the technical appendix.   
Measurement of Variables 
The list of diseases includes the most prevalent conditions in the HRS survey:  
hypertension, stroke, heart disease, lung disease, diabetes and cancer.  An individual’s 
disease status is estimated using the responses to questions of the form: "Has a doctor 
ever told you that you had…."  Consistent with the chronic nature of these illnesses, we 
assume there is no chance of recovery and model the time until diagnosis (after age 50).  
Second, we consider risk factors, focusing particularly on smoking and obesity. 
We model transitions across three “obesity” states: not obese (BMI<25), overweight (25-
30) and obese (BMI>30). This information is derived from self-reports on weight and 
height; while not as accurate as physical measurement, they are nonetheless highly 
predictive of population outcomes.  For smoking, we model whether the respondent:  has 
never smoked, has ever smoked but quit, or is still smoking at the time of the interview.  
Third, we measure functional status using ADL (activities of daily living) and 
IADL (instrumental activities of daily living) limitations. These are counts of positive 
answers to questions (5 for ADL limitations and 7 for IADL limitations) such as whether 
the respondent has trouble walking, getting out of bed, dressing, etc.  IADLs are typically 
less severe impairments than ADLs.  We measure functional status by classifying 
respondents into the following categories:  no IADL or ADL limitations, 1-2 IADL 
limitations but no ADL limitations, 1-2 ADL limitations, or 3+ ADL limitations.  This 
classification scheme yields four mutually exclusive categories (based on the data). These 
are not assumed to be absorbing states in that we allow for recovery. 
Next, we add labor force and benefit receipt outcomes.  (We express all monetary 
units in terms of 2004 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.)  First, we track whether 
someone works for pay (any positive hours), and we track earnings on the main job. We 
also track whether the respondent has employer-based health insurance, or derives 
coverage from other sources (apart from Medicare). We do this for the population 
younger than age 65. After age 65, nearly all respondents have insurance through 
Medicare.  An individual can derive coverage through his employer, the employer of 
his/her spouse, a private insurer, or a government assistance program such as Medicaid   11 
(if disabled). We also record whether someone has a pension on his job, and whether this 
is a defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution (DC) type. If the respondent reports a 
DC pension, we also consider the self-reported account balance as another dependent 
variable.  If the respondent reports a DB pension, we record the earliest age at which the 
pension can be claimed, as well as the number of years on the job and the normal 
retirement age on that plan. We also construct a variable recording whether someone is 
claiming a DB pension on the current job (quitting a job with a DB pension). Hence, we 
have two binary state variables (DC and DB entitlement) and one continuous state-
variable (DC account balance) to take account of private pensions.  
We model Social Security retirement benefit receipt using the self-reported age at 
which benefits were first claimed.  Since we have access to earnings records for 
respondents in the HRS, we also determine who is eligible upon reaching age 62 using 
quarters of coverage. We construct the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) for 
the initial interview and update the AIME in the simulation using a simplified rule as in 
French (2005).
6  The AIME is the basis for computing benefits. We also model disability 
insurance (DI) benefit receipt and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) using self-reports 
from the HRS. When reporting SSI figures however, we use a measurement error 
correction model estimated from merging self-reported with administrative data from 
SSA to correct for underreporting (see Technical Appendix for details).  
We then add measures of financial resources.  We construct a measure of net 
financial wealth using self-reports from the HRS and imputations performed by RAND 
(Hurd, Hoynes et al. 1998). Net financial wealth is defined as the value of financial assets 
(checking, savings, stocks, IRAs, Certificate deposits, bonds) plus the value of real assets 
(primary house, other real estate, other real assets) minus all debt (mortgage, home loans, 
credit cards, etc).  We also track earnings, and whether wealth is positive.  To account for 
the skewness of the wealth and earnings distribution, we use the generalized inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation. For both wealth and earnings, we censor observations 
above the 99
th percentile in 2004.  
                                                 
6 We estimate a regression function of next period’s AIME as a function of baseline AIME and earnings. 
We allow coefficients to be age specific and consider a second-order approximation. Estimates available 
upon request.   12 
Finally, we track nursing home residence, and mortality.  The HRS initially did 
not sample from the nursing home population.  Because our simulations typically start at 
age 50, this is not a major limitation.  More importantly, the HRS follows respondents 
into nursing homes and also records transition back to independent or assisted living 
outside nursing homes.  Mortality is recorded in exit interviews in the HRS. Mortality 
hazards derived from the HRS correspond closely with life-table probabilities (Adams, 
Hurd et al. 2003; Michaud, Kapteyn et al. 2006)). 
Model Restrictions 
We make several restrictions on the transition risks permitted in the model.  First, 
we only allow feedback from diseases where clinical research supports such a link based 
on consultation with several physicians from the Southern California Evidence-Based 
Practice Center. For example, we allow hypertensive patients to have higher risk of heart 
disease, but we do not allow hypertensive patients to have higher risk of cancer. These 
clinical restrictions are documented in the technical appendix and elsewhere (Goldman, 
Hurd et al. 2004). 
Another important restriction we impose is that economic outcomes do not 
feedback to health. This is consistent with the findings from previous studies (Adams, 
Hurd et al. 2003). SES does not appear to have a causal effect on health outcomes in this 
age range.  The correlation between SES and health appears to be generated by feedback 
effects from health to economic status, most notably through the effect of health shocks 
on labor supply and medical spending.  Also playing a role are predetermined (earlier) 
events or common factors (genetics, etc) that induce a non-causal correlation between 
SES and health.  These two factors are accounted for in the estimation. 
B.2.4  Policy Outcomes 
The model simulates a number of relevant health and economic outcomes for individuals.  
First, we consider a set of health outcomes such as life expectancy, healthy life 
expectancy (no ADL limitations), and medical expenditures. Average medical 
expenditures by disease and demographic group are calculated from two sources. For 
those younger than age 65, we use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and 
include in medical expenditures the respondents’ medical care costs and the cost of drugs. 
For those above age 65, we use the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). The   13 
MEPS is known to under-predict expenditures compared to National Health Expenditure 
Accounts (NHEA) (Sing et al., 2006). We also find that the MCBS under-predicts 
expenditures from the NHEA. Without adjustment, we seem to under predict payments 
(by $59 billion for Medicare and $38 billion for Medicaid). Our cost estimates are based 
on average expenditures in the Medical Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) and total 
costs in the MCBS are also lower than in the NHEA.  The MCBS is known to undercount 
medical spending by both the Congressional Budget Office and the CMS (Christensen 
and Wagner 2000).
7  Hence, we adjust those numbers to match the NHEA, inflating costs 
by 15%. More detail can be found in the Appendix (section 5, p. 12).  
In addition to the individual outcomes, the model predicts revenues and 
expenditures by the Federal Government, for the age 50+ population.  As part of the 
predicted medical expenditures, we also predict expenditures by source, including those 
by Medicare and Medicaid.  Next, we compute Social Security retirement benefits for 
those predicted to receive such benefits. Since we have the AIME of both respondent and 
spouse, we can precisely estimate the distribution of retirement benefits. We account for 
spouse and survivor benefits. We also compute disability insurance (DI) benefits and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). As Michaud et al. (2009) report, the simulation is 
able to replicate basic fiscal aggregates for 2004. We compute DB pension income from 
average pension payments by tenure, last earnings and early and normal retirement ages 
using Pension Plan characteristics reported by Employers of HRS respondents. Using all 
these income flows, for the respondent and the spouse (if present), we compute net 
household income where taxes include Federal, State, City income taxes as well as the 
Social Security taxes (OASDI and Medicare). More detail is provided in the appendix.  
B.2.5  Simulation Methods 
For population scenarios, the simulation starts with the existing age 50+ population in the 
2004 wave of the HRS. The microsimulation is stochastic, meaning that transitions are 
randomly drawn from the joint distribution of state variables which is estimated from the 
HRS. There are two stochastic elements in the model: the simulation of new cohorts and 
the simulation of transitions. To generate new cohorts, we make use of the estimated joint 
                                                 
7The Congressional Budget Office, for example, inflated MCBS prescription drug spending by 15 percent to 
produce its official forecast of the cost of Part D.    14 
distribution and use random draws from the correlated errors to generate a new cohort. 
Second, for each respondent in a given year, we calculate transition probabilities. We 
then draw random numbers to attribute new outcomes. This process is repeated a number 
of times to ensure independence from any particular sequence of random numbers. We 
average over 10 replications. For cohort scenarios, we only use the 2004 age 50 cohort 
and simulate outcomes until everyone has died. 
C.  Results 
As noted earlier, our objectives are to assess whether health differences explain the 
longevity gap, and to quantify the fiscal consequences of gradually closing the health 
gap.  To meet the first objective, we examine the 2004 cohort of 50 year-olds, and 
consider the counterfactual in which Americans have the same health as Europeans.  The 
resulting longevity is compared to the longevity predicted using the baseline health status 
of Americans.  We also assess the total differences in public spending generated by these 
underlying differences in health. The second experiment requires analyzing population-
level projections for health and economic outcomes if we gradually moved American 
health levels to those of Europeans.  
C.1  Explaining Longevity Differences 
We use the prevalence rates presented in Figure 3 to construct the first counterfactual 
cohort. We simulate the baseline outcomes of the cohort using the adjusted prevalence 
rates from European data. Using the methodology outlined in B.2.2, we preserve the 
correlation between health and other outcomes in the model. We keep other socio-
economic characteristics constant at American levels while varying health status of the 
cohort. We then simulate transitions until every one dies in the simulation. We compare 
this counterfactual with the status quo case where American health is unchanged.  
Our baseline projection of remaining life-expectancy at age 50 is 31 years. This is 
very close to the 30.98 years estimate from life tables presented in Figure 1. In Figure 5, 
assigning European health status levels to Americans increases healthy life expectancy 
(years without ADLs) by 1.3 years, and decreases unhealthy life expectancy (years with 
1+ ADLs) by a tenth of a year. The overall effect is to increase life expectancy by 1.2   15 
years, which is 92% of the difference in life expectancy reported in World Health 
Organization data. 
These gaps in health and longevity have important fiscal consequences.  The 
resulting change in life expectancy may increase both revenues and expenditures, while 
possibly reducing medical care costs.  Table 3 computes the overall fiscal effects on a per 
capita basis. Revenue would increase by $2,425 per capita, partly due to the increase in 
life expectancy and increase in earnings/labor force participation. On the expenditure 
side, there are two effects. First, old age pension benefits increase by a substantial 
amount ($6593 per capita). This is roughly the size of the average annual Social Security 
benefit payment.  But, there is a larger decrease in Medicare, Medicaid and Disability 
insurance (DI) benefit payments. Total lifetime health care expenditures decrease by a 
stunning $17,791. This represents an 8.5% reduction in lifetime medical expenditures. 
The average reduction in lifetime payments is $4,717 for Medicare and $3,687 for 
Medicaid. Adding the reduction in DI costs, the net effect on government expenditures is 
$2,477 per capita. Overall the net fiscal impact of this scenario is an increase in per capita 
net revenue of $4,902 for the government.  
C.2  Long-Term Financial Consequences 
The experiment above computes the contribution of health differences to longevity, and 
public spending.  We are also interested in the more practical question concerning the 
consequences of gradually, rather than immediately, moving cohorts of near-elderly 
Americans towards the health status of their European counterparts.  
To implement a gradual scenario we allow prevalence rates in the entering cohort 
to reach European levels by 2030. This is compared to a status quo scenario in which 
current trends observed and projected among the new elderly persist. Hence, this scenario 
can be interpreted as a transition from the current steady-state to a new one. The fiscal 
effects have a direct economic interpretation for policies that would help reach that 
steady-state.  Figure 6 provides the time path for various conditions among entering 
cohorts in the baseline and the counterfactual scenario. Each year, the population alive is 
representative of the age 50+ population alive in the U.S.    16 
We report the results for the status quo in Table 4. Given current trends, we 
project the size of the population aged 50+ will increase by nearly 75% from 80.7 million 
in 2004 to 144 million in 2050. The population forecast for 2050 is very close to that of 
the Social Security Administration (80.8 million). Life expectancy is projected to 
increase from 31 years in 2004, to 31.6 years in 2050. However, as estimated in Michaud 
et al. (2009), this improvement is likely to coincide with more time spent in a disabled 
state, since disability-free life expectancy is projected to be lower in 2050.  
We compare the baseline to the scenario described in Figure 6, of gradual 
movement towards European prevalence levels.  Table 5 reports the results. Because of 
longevity gains, the population age 50+ is 4%, or 5.75 million, larger in 2050.   The 
population is also much healthier in 2030 and 2050 than under the status quo. For 
example, the obesity rate falls by 24 percentage points, while the prevalence of lifetime 
smoking and of diabetes both fall by roughly 10 percentage points each.  
Government revenue rises by 10%, or $30 billion, by 2050, as a result of the 
longevity gains. As before, there are two offsetting expenditure effects.  On one hand, 
longer lives imply larger annuity burdens:  OASI benefits go up by $70.4 billion. On the 
other hand, medical costs decrease by $124 billion, or 6.7%, in 2050.  Medicare saves 
$36.4 billion despite the increase in longevity.  The overall effect on expenditures is 
initially negative, but turns positive by 2050.   As found in Michaud et al. (2009), a 
transition to better health first decreases expenditures, but gains in longevity eventually 
exert upward pressure on spending.  
In Figure 7, the gains in health expenditure materialize quickly, while the annuity 
burden takes longer to emerge. This is essentially a timing issue, cost savings due to 
lower disability appear before extensions in life expectancy. The total effect on 
expenditures is largest around 2030 and goes to zero by 2050. Since revenue rises as 
well, the net fiscal effect is positive in 2050 but slowly converging to zero. Hence, the 
transition to better health involves important fiscal effects, but these largely vanish once 
the new equilibrium is reached.  
Figure 8 shows that, in present value terms from the 2004 perspective, the 
increase in tax revenue almost entirely offsets the annuity burden. The effect on health 
expenditures remains. The present discounted value of Medicare and Medicaid savings   17 
combined is $632 billion, or 1.6 years of combined 2004 spending on the two programs. 
In terms of total medical spending, the present value of those savings is $1.1 trillion 
dollars. 
C.3  Robustness to Cross-Country Differences in Diagnosis 
An alternative interpretation of cross-country differences in health focuses on differences 
in rates of diagnosis, rather than real differences in health status.  The literature 
documents under-diagnosis of diseases like diabetes and hypertension in the US (Smith, 
2007), but it is difficult to find comparable European studies. However, one direct 
analysis of this question suggests that differences in diagnosis are relatively modest.  
Banks et al. (2006) compare objective clinical diagnosis among men, using commonly 
used thresholds on biomarkers, to self-reports of whether respondents have previously 
been diagnosed.  For diabetes among those aged 40-70, they find a clinical prevalence of 
4.8% in the UK and 8.9% in the US, but self-reported prevalence of 4.4% and 8.6%, 
respectively.  The cross-country difference is similar using self-reports or clinical 
measurements (4.2% versus 4.1%). They find a similar result for hypertension. These 
discrepancies are not large relative to the differences we observe in the data.   
Of course, the Banks et al. evidence is somewhat narrow in its focus on diabetes 
and hypertension, and on the US-UK difference specifically.  To test the sensitivity of our 
results to diagnostic differences, we ran the cohort analysis under various assumptions 
about differential diagnosis. We defined 6 scenarios in which the difference between the 
U.S. and Europe prevalence rates for doctor-diagnosed diseases went from 0% to 100% 
of the differences we found in the data. In all these scenarios, we kept differences in 
obesity and smoking constant, as differential reporting across countries seems less clearly 
linked to systematic institutional factors. Figure 9 reports the variation in computed life 
expectancy across these various scenarios. If all of the difference we observed was due to 
under-reporting, life expectancy would only increase by 0.25 years, as a result of 
differences in baseline obesity and smoking.  On the other hand, the absence of 
differential diagnosis yields an effect of 1.2 years.  If the Banks et al., result holds more 
generally, and there is at most a 5% difference in diagnosis, the effect drops to about 1.1   18 
year.  This suggests that the differences are likely to remain meaningful under reasonably 
assumptions about differential diagnosis.  
D.  Conclusion 
There is a growing longevity gap between the US and Europe with no settled 
interpretation.  We have demonstrated that differences in observed disease prevalence can 
almost entirely account for this difference.  In this sense, the international longevity gap 
appears much easier to explain than, for instance, the racial or socioeconomic longevity 
gaps, which are not well explained by health differences.  Internationally, however, there 
is no “American-specific” effect on longevity, above and beyond differences in disease at 
age 50.  This suggests further that addressing the health gap will likely erase the 
longevity gap, although the same cannot necessarily be said for analogous disparities 
within countries. 
  Clearly, further research is needed into the cause of the gap in good health, 
although several candidates have emerged through our investigation.  The expansion of 
the gap in longevity and health coincided with relative increases in obesity among the US 
population.  Moreover, near-elderly cohorts of Americans took up smoking at much 
higher rates than their European counterparts.   
The gap in health and longevity has obvious private costs to the citizens suffering 
from disease.  There are also significant public finance consequences, to the tune of 
$17,800 in per capita medical costs, and net public finance costs of roughly five thousand 
dollars per capita. Gradual transitions of US cohorts towards European levels could 
generate large fiscal benefits.  In the long-run, medical expenditures may fall by $1.1 
trillion on a present value basis. It is not clear which policies could help reach this goal. 
But if history is a guide, looking back at the success of anti-smoking campaigns, it shows 
that changing behaviors is possible.  The costs of such policies will need to be weighted 
against the welfare and economic consequences we have analyzed in this paper. 
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Source: Human Mortality Database period life tables for 1975 and 2005. European countries are Denmark, 
France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Weighted average using population size age 50.   22 
 
Figure 2 
Smoking measured as grams of tobacco consumed per capita, age 15+ 
 
 
Obesity measured as BMI>=30, age 15+ 
Source: OECD Health data 2008. Obesity European countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden. Greece and Spain are not included in tobacco figure for lack of data.   23 
 
Figure 3 Health Differences between U.S. and SHARE-Europe Population Aged 50-53 
 
 
Source: Health and Retirement Study 2004 and Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) 2004 (Demnark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden). Sample 
weights used. Question text and definition available in Technical Appendix. Obese status defined as body-
mass index greater than 30. ADL are limitations in activities of daily living.   24 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the microsimulation model on the cohort entering the model in 2004. 
WHO difference is between remaining life expectancy in the age range 50-54 of Europeans compared to 
Americans. We used the World Health Organization’s WHOSIS database to calculate this difference. 
Population weighted for Europe (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and 
Sweden).   26 
 
Figure 6 Population Scenarios 
Status Quo Scenario (Prevalence in Entering Cohort) 
 
European Scenario (Prevalence in Entering Cohort) 






Source: Authors’ own calculations using the microsimulation model. Health expenditure include Medicare 
and Medicaid. Social Security includes SSI,DI and OASI expenditures. Net Fiscal Impact is the revenue 
change minus the total expenditure change. All amounts in billions $2004 and refer to the difference 























Source: Authors’ calculations using the microsimulation model. Amounts in billion $2004 and represent 
the difference between the European scenario and the status quo scenario as defined in Figure 6. Present 
discounted value calculated using a 3% real discount rate from 2004 to 2050. Tax revenue includes Federal, 
State and Social Security amd Medicare Taxes. SS stands for Social Security Benefit Payments, DI for 












Source: Authors’ calculations using the microsimulation model. The figure shows the average life 
expectancy of a 50 year old under different scenarios regarding the difference between Americans and 
Europeans in terms of doctor diagnosed diseases. 0% refers to a scenario where Americans and Europeans 
have the same prevalence of doctor diagnosed diseases. They have however different levels of obesity and 
smoking. The 100% scenario refers to the scenario considered in the analysis: there is no relative 
underdiagnosis in Europe.    30 
  
Table 1  
Outcomes in the Transition Model 
Health SES & Other
Disease LFP & Benefit Status
heart disease working
hypertension DB pension receipt
stroke SS benefit receipt
lung disease DI benefit receipt
cancer Any Health insurance
diabetes ssi receipt
Risk factors Financial Resources
Smoking Status financial wealth
never smoked earnings
ever smoked wealth positive
current smoker









Notes: See Appendix for more details  
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Table 2  
Outcomes in the Model for New Cohorts 
Binary Censored Discrete
working for pay Any db plan
positive wealth Any dc plan
hypertension Censored Ordered
heart disease Early Age eligible DB
diabetes <52
any health insurance 52-57
SRH fair/poor 58>





























Scenario  Difference 
Government Revenues       
Federal Tax  46,289  47,637  1,348 
State Tax  16,035  16,535  500 
Social security payroll taxes  16,566  17,031  465 
Medicare payroll taxes  4,020  4,132  112 
Total  82,910  85,335  2,425 
        
Government Expenditures       
Old Age and Survivors Insurance benefits (OASI)  138,123  144,716  6,593 
Supplementary Security Income (SSI)  3,454  3,471  17 
Disability Insurance benefits (DI)  6,356  5,673  -683 
Medicare costs  73,391  68,674  -4,717 
Medicaid costs  21,745  18,058  -3,687 
Total  243,069  240,592  -2,477 
       
Net Fiscal Effect      4,902 
       
Total Health Care Expenditures  210,993  193,202  -17,791 
           
Source: authors' calculations using the microsimulation model for the cohort entering the model 
in 2004. Amounts reported in $2004 USD. Present discounted values computed using a real 
discount rate of 3%. Total Health Care Expenditures include private health insurance and other 




Table 4  
 
 Population Level Outcomes Under Status-Quo Scenario (2004-2050) 
   Status Quo Estimates 
   Year 
   2004  2030  2050 
Population size (Million)  80.71  122.13  145.05 
Population 65+ (Million)  36.25  66.87  81.37 
Prevalence of selected conditions          
obesity (BMI >=30) (%)  28.1%  41.1%  45.8% 
over weight (25<=BMI<30) (%)  38.1%  37.8%  36.3% 
Ever-smoked  58.6%  48.0%  38.6% 
Smoking now  16.9%  9.6%  6.2% 
Diabetes  17.0%  24.8%  27.8% 
Heart disease  23.0%  28.1%  29.9% 
Hypertension  50.9%  58.9%  62.2% 
Government revenues from aged 51+ (Billion $2004)       
Federal personal income taxes  216.44  228.62  249.33 
Social security payroll taxes  73.82  86.79  96.63 
Medicare payroll taxes  18.67  20.98  23.33 
Government expenditures from aged 51+ (Billion $2004)          
Old Age and Survivors Insurance benefits (OASI)  417.15  992.47  1,272.07 
Disability Insurance benefits (DI)  36.99  36.02  40.77 
Supplementary Security Income (SSI)  17.06  26.44  37.94 
Medicare costs  290.24  549.44  735.69 
Medicaid costs  118.72  152.66  228.44 
Total medical costs for aged 51+ (Billion $2004)  851.05  1,412.58  1,826.03 
Source: authors' calculation using the microsimulation model under the status quo scenario described in 
the text.  All dollars are in 2004 values. Output reported for the years 2004, 2030 and 2050.   34 
 
Table 5   
 
 
2030 2050 2030 2050
Population size (Million) 123.74 150.81 1.605 5.752
Population 65+ (Million) 67.95 86.52 1.072 5.147
Prevalence of selected conditions
obesity (BMI >=30) (%) 27.5% 21.6% -0.136 -0.242
over weight (25<=BMI<30) (%)36.4% 35.6% -0.013 -0.007
Ever-smoked 38.2% 28.0% -0.098 -0.107
Smoking now 7.9% 5.3% -0.016 -0.010
Diabetes 19.1% 17.0% -0.057 -0.108
Heart disease 25.1% 25.7% -0.030 -0.042
Hypertension 50.3% 48.3% -0.086 -0.139
Government revenues from aged 51+ (Billion $2004)
Federal personal income taxes 244.59 275.97 15.970 26.644
Social security payroll taxes 88.75 99.11 1.957 2.481
Medicare payroll taxes 21.46 23.95 0.480 0.620
Government expenditures from aged 51+ 
(Billion $2004)
Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance benefits (OASI) 1,004.97 1,342.42 12.499 70.358
Disability Insurance benefits 
(DI) 32.29 35.94 -3.732 -4.837
Supplementary Security Income (SSI) 25.55 38.83 -0.890 0.890
Medicare costs 527.96 699.21 -21.481 -36.488
Medicaid costs 133.50 201.49 -19.158 -26.951
Net Fiscal Effect 51.169 26.773
Total medical costs for aged 51+ (Billion 
$2004) 1,327.72 1,701.61 -84.854 -124.422
Source: authors' calculations using the microsimulation model under the European 
scenario. All dollars in 2004 values
Population Level Outcomes under European Scenario (2004-2050)
Absolute Change European Scenario  35 
Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Question Text for Prevalence of Chronic Conditions 
 
HRS SHARE
Question Has a doctor ever told you 
that you have …
Has a doctor ever told you that you 
had any of the conditions on this 
card? Please tell me the number or 
numbers of the conditions. 
Heart disease ...a heart attack, coronary 
heartdisease, angina, 
congestive heart failure, or 
other heart problems?
...A heart attack including myocardial 
infarction or coronary thrombosis or 
any other heart problem including 
congestive heart failure
Hypertension ...high blood pressure or 
hypertension?
...High blood pressure or 
hypertension
Stroke ...a stroke? ...A stroke or cerebral vascular 
disease
Diabetes ...diabetes or high blood 
sugar?
...Diabetes or high blood sugar
Lung disease ...chronic lung disease such 
aschronic bronchitis or 
emphysema?
...Chronic lung disease such as 
chronic bronchitis or emphysema
Cancer ...cancer or a malignant 
tumor, excluding minor skin 
cancers?
...Cancer or malignant tumour, 
including leukaemia or lymphoma, 
but excluding minor skin cancers
Notes: Extract from Questionnaire from each survey. 